Fourth Islamic Summit held in Casablanca in 1984 -the first OIC summit that Turkey attended at the highest level-the Republic of Turkey's ties with the OIC gradually increased. 2 Turkey's intensifying relations with the OIC in this time frame may be analyzed in three periods: 1969-1973, 1974-1980 and 1980-1983. The Turkish decision to attend the Rabat Conference in September 1969 came as part of the implementation of Turkey's nevv foreign policy the principles and objectives of vvhich emerged around the mid-1960s. 3 It vvas prompted chiefly by Turkey's need to seek international support for her Cyprus cause. It had seemed impossible to elicit such support through the perpetuation of her exclusive alliance ties vvith the West of the 1950s -already tangibly damaged, anyvvay, by the reluctance of the United States to support Turkey on her Cyprus cause in 1964. 4 These ties appeared to have left Turkey virtually isolated in the Third World. 5 The main objective of Turkey's prestige in the eyes of both the Islamic countries and the West, not necessarily in the sense of being able to control the "minds and actions" of these countries in their mutual relations, as Democrat Party Administrations appeared to have attempted in the 1950s, but to create an atmosphere of intimacy betvveen Turkey and these countries at the minimum level that vvould enable the former to be esteemed and consulted on various matters and its contributions to regional politics, no matter hovv modest to be sought and respeeted. Other objectives vvhich appeared to be thought of by the Turks as either the result of or complementary to the objective of prestige vvere: eliciting the support of the Islamic World for Turkey's international causes, like Cyprus; contributing to regional stability, as required by the "Peace at Home, Peace Abroad" policy: and developing relations vvith the Islamic countries in ali possible fields vvithout any prejudice to Turkey's special ties vvith the West. Ali these objectives vvere supposed to be achieved through a strict compliance vvith the principle of neutrality, meaning non-interference in both Islamic countries' dealings with each other and their relations with the Western countries. Turkey's special ties with the West were not considered an obstacle; rather they were considered to be instuments making Turkey an "example" to be emulated by the Islamic countries in re-designing their internal and foreign policies.
During and following her attendance in Rabat, Turkey maintained an uncommitted posture toward the OIC activities in the early 1970s. During the Rabat Summit, for example, it was represented not by the Turkish President, although he had been invited, but by the Foreign Minister. Similarly, at the First session of the Islamic Conference of Fereign Ministers in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, in March 1970, it was the Under-Secretary of the Turkish Foreign Affairs Ministry, who represented Turkey, did not participate in deliberations. On this occasion, Turkey carefully refrained from committing itself to regular participation in the upcoming meetings, although it did not oppose the idea of establishing a General Secretariat for the Organization. 6 It also refrained from approving the Charter of the Organization which indicated a "resolution" on the part of the participants "... to preserve Islamic spiritual, ethical, social and economic values" and to "...promote Islamic solidarity among member states". 7 This was on the grounds that the Charter in this form appeared to contravene both the secular Turkish constitution, which established a clear-cut separation of religious and temporal affairs, and Turkey's continuing international status as a member of the Western community and an ally in the Western alliance. 8 As a response to the radical tone of the Decharations of the OIC Conference vvith respect both the Palestinian question as a political question and the policy to be pursued against Israel, Turkey announced its approval of these Declarations "in so far as [they were] compatible with the UN Resolutions that Turkey has approved as well as with the fundamental principles of Turkish foreign policy". 9 A notable shift in Turkey's role in the OIC meetings from the early reserved stance tovvard a more active participation occurred in the period of [1974] [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] . This was the outcome of certain internal and external factors, chiefly economic in nature. The Turkish economy faced difficulties in the first half of the 1970s, for various reasons including increased oil prices in the wake of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war and the emerging crisis in relations between Turkey and the EEC. 10 The migration of Turkish workers to Europe came to a virtual standstill as of 1974, with a parallel decline in their remittances. Thus, Turkey became more interested in developing economic ties vvith the Islamic world than it had been in the 1960s. The main political incentive for Turkey in developing its relations with the Islamic world in this period was the increased importance, in Turkish eyes, of mustering international support to the Cyprus issue in the vvake of the Turkish military intervention on that island in July 1974. Following this operation, Turkey's special alliance vvith the United States received another blovv, and one more serious than that of 1964, vvhen in February 1975 the latter imposed an arms embargo on Turkey to punish it for its action in Cyprus. Although the religious conservative National Salvation Party (NSP), a partner in coalition governments formed after 1973, also contributed to the development of Turkey's relations vvith the Islamic vvorld and the OIC, this party's actual influence on the process of rapprochement remained limited.
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Turkey's active participation in OIC meetings and its cooperation vvith this organization in the 1974-1980 period vvere manifested in both political and economic matters. At the level of political co-operation, for example, Turkey's active support for the Arab cause in the Arab-Israeli conflict became evident most notably in Turkey's changing policy on the Palestinian issue. In stark contrast to its previous position, Turkey openly recognized for the first time the "right" of the people of Palestine to "national independence and sovereignty". This led to the eventual opening of a PLO offıce in Ankara in 1979. Turkey also supported Arab positions -including the equation of Zionism vvith racism-in international fora.
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At the level of economic co-operation, in contrast to its attitude of the 1960s, Turkey supported projects for the establishment of a common market among the Islamic countries, no longer finding Turkey's participation in such undertakings incompatible vvith its links vvith the EEC. 13 The istanbul Conference of May 1976, which was the first OIC meeting in Turkey, constituted a landmark in the swiftly developing relations between Turkey and the OIC. At this conference, the Turkish government even went to the extent of declaring its decision to approve the charter of the OlC-conditional on subsequent ratification by the Turkish parliament, not realized to this day (Summer of 1992) and with the reservation that the approval would hold to the extent that the Charter in question was in conformity with the secular Turkish constitution.
14 This was an important step in the direction of Turkey's full membership of the Organization.
Perhaps the most notable achievement of Turkey from its increasing economic and political cooperation with the OIC in the period of 1974-1980 vvas the support it elicited from the OIC on its Cyprus cause. The OIC recognized "the equality of rights of the two Cyprus communities... and their right to be heard in alî international forums..." -the Turkish position-in a formal resolution passed, for the first time since the Rabat Conference, during the istanbul Conference of Foreign Ministers in May 1976. 15 The istanbul Conference also agreed that the representatives of the Turkish Müslim community of Cyprus be invited to attend future meetings of the OIC as a "guest". Later, the Tenth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers held in Fez, Morocco, in May 1979, not only accepted the change of this "guest" status to that of "observer", but also called for the OIC members to support the Turkish Cypriot Community hurt by the economic embargo imposed on it by the Greek Cypriot leadership of the island.
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II. A New Momentum in Turkey's Relations Wıth the OIC: 1980-83:
The period of 1980-1983 was a preparatory period for the subsequent one in vvhich relations betvveen Turkey and the OIC bloomed. The period of 1980-1983 saw the importance of the OIC in Turkish foreign policy grow. This fact vvas largely due to the improvement of the Turkish economy that came in the vvake of the military intervention in Turkish politics on September 12, 1980, vvhich brought internal unity and stability into the politically chaotic atmosphere prevailing in Turkey. exports, brought about by the successful implementation of the economic resolution of January 1980, which was based on domestic production and export promotion, made the markets of the Islamic countries more important than ever for the Turks.
From the increasing economic relations vvith the Islamic states, the Turks expected to derive certain economic benefits.
17 They vvanted to fınd business opportunities for Turkish firms and to relieve the unemployment problem -exacerbated by the reluctance of the Western European States to continue admitting Turkish workers and their even seeking to return the ones they had-by sending Turkish workers to Arab states. They vvanted to close or reduce Turkey's balance of foreign payments deficits -for which trade vvith the EEC could be of no help-caused by the high cost of oil. Finally, the Turks hoped to gain access to Arab petro-dollars, as an alternative to the credits they had been unable to obtain in sufficient amounts from Western sources, in order to engage in joint economic activities and to carry out many cooperative development projects.
The OIC provided Turkey vvith a useful framevvork in vvhich progress could be made to achieve ali these economic objectives. Beginning in 1980, Turkey took majör leading initiatives in the OIC in the implementation of the "General Agreement for Economic, Commercial and Technical Cooperation" for the Islamic countries approved by the Eighth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers in 1977. It hosted, for example, a high-level Islamic meeting in Ankara in November 1980 vvhich drafted a common strategy for economic cooperation among the Islamic countries, called the "Plan for Action". The "Plan for Action" constituted the framevvork for the goal of economic integration and the eventual establishment of an Islamic Common Market. It vvas adopted by the Third Islamic Summit Conference held in Taif, Saudi Arabia, in January 1982, an occasion hailed by the offıcials of the OIC as "the turning point in the history of the OIC as far as economic cooperation among member states is concerned". As far as the members of the OIC were concerned, the impact of their international orientation as members of the Non-Aligned group also affected their attitudes on the Cyprus issue, in a way that prevented full cooperation between the two sides, on this issue. Thus, they did not recognize the selfproclaimed Turkish state in Northern Cyprus in November 1983, either individually or collectively. Rather ironically, U.S. diplomatic pressure on the OIC member countries also played a role here. Nevertheless, they continued to support Turkey's stance in favour of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation of Cyprus based on the equality of the two communities at Islamic Conferences, considering such a support as the minimum requirement of good relations vvith Turkey. Despite its total isolation in the vvorld as the only country recognizing the nevv Turkish state in Cyprus, Turkey did not react sharply to this, but expressed the belief that this recognition vvould come in time. 23 This mild Turkish response combined vvith the understanding the OIC members in general displayed about the vvay Turkey's policies on the Islamic issues mentioned above fell short of satisfying them fully signalled the determination of both sides to keep together in cognizance of common interests binding them.
Indeed, despite the existence of these differences, the importance of political co-operation increased in the eyes of the Turks and the members of the OIC in general in the period of 1980-83, even though this may not have been as visibly demonstrated as vvas the case vvith economic cooperation betvveen them in the same period. Certain regional events that took place in this period, like the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, the revolution in Iran that began in the same year, and the Iran-Iraq vvar that began in September 1980, made the members of the OIC and Turkey genuinely more concerned vvith the sources of instability in the region other than Arab-Israeli conflict. The OIC could be utilized as an international platform in vvhich forces be joined to contain and defuse such crises.
From the perspective of the members of the OIC, vvho vvere vvilling to cooperate vvith Turkey to this end, this country vvas an important partner due to its important regional status stemming from its stable regime, developing economy, military might and status as an important strategic ally also the Turkish position on the policy to be pursued against Israel as distinct from that of the OIC in JPRS, November 10, 1980, pp. 24 From Turkey's perspective, the OIC provided a useful means through vvhich it could boost its prestige, make its presence felt in the region in a positive way, contribute better to the maintenance of peace and stability in the region through combined efforts of other Islamic countries and not damage its neutral status in doing this because of collaboration with other Islamic states sponsored by the OIC. A case in point vvas Turkey's actual participation as a member in the "Islamic Peace Committee" established by the OIC vvith a mission of "seeking ways and means of bringing about a peaceful, just and lasting solution" to the Iran-Iraq conflict. Without the framevvork of such an OIC mission, Turkey's actual unilateral contacts vvith Iran and Iraq to induce them to stop fighting each other vvould have been bound to remain futile, since both sides refused any Turkish advice to this effect and Turkey, afraid of being accused by the parties of taking sides, vvas not in a position to mediate.
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Of course, in terms of its effectiveness in reaching its ultimate objectives in a reasonably short time, the actual capacity of such OIC missions could validly be questioned. As far as the Iran-Iraq war vvas concerned, for example, it vvas impossible for the diplomatic efforts of the Islamic Peace Committee to bring about peace in view of the determination of both warring parties to try their chances at the batdefront first. Besides, Iran deeply mistrusted even the "Islamic Peace Committee" suspecting it of taking sides vvith Iraq something that potentially made the efforts of this committee bound to fail from the very beginning. This case typically demonstrated the helplessness of Islamic solidarity backed by Turkey when faced vvith radicalism. 26 Stili, hovvever, Turkish participation in it offered better prospects for success than Turkey acting alone, for the reasons mentioned above. 
III. Turkey's "Active
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[. highest level. Furthermore, the summit appointed the Turkish president to the Chairmanship of the Standing Committee on Economic and Commercial Cooperation (COMCEC), one of six specialized OIC committees the mandate of which involved "playing an eminent role in determining the policies and defining priorities in vital fields such as economy, commerce..." 27 Turkey, thus, assumed a leading role in efforts to achieve a fundamental goal set forth by the OIC charter, namely, "the consolidation of cooperation among member states". This confirmed the esteem vvith vvhich it vvas treated in the OIC.
These novelties in the relations betvveen Turkey and the OIC provoked speculation in the Western press as to vvhether they constituted the first signs of a foreign policy change on the part of the nevv Motherland Party [But] the extent of this role vvill be determined on the one hand by our general foreign policy, and on the other, by the vvay the situation develops in the region". 30 In various intervievvs made vvith him in February 1984 and December 1985, he explained that vvith its large population, military strength and grovving economic strength Turkey vvould have to increase its involvement in regional politics; and vvith an increased stake, vvould have to contribute more to the preservation of peace in the region.
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In vvhat context did the Motherland Party Administrations that ruled Turkey until late 1991 believe that partnership vvith the OIC could be expected to serve national objectives? Here, it must first be noted that despite their admittedly "too ambitious initial expectations" concerning specific projects vvhich it vvas presumed vvould lead to the formation of the Islamic Common Market, the Turks had never seemed to have optimistic expectations concerning the creation of an Islamic Common Market vvhen the projects in that direction vvere started in the early 1980s if only because of their avvareness that the Islamic countries did not constitute a regional unit and pursued different policies in various fields. 32 As far as Motherland Party Administrations vvere concerned, although they perceivedly brought a nevv emphasis to the economic aspects of Turkey's foreign relations in relative disregard of its political aspects, this nevv emphasis vvas not devoid of political considerations as certain domestic critics of the foreign policy they pursued contended. 33 In fact, these Administrations intended to use Turkey's foreign economic ties as an instrument, not only to internationalize the Turkish economy, something vvhich they savv as essential for Turkey's economic development, but also to implement Atatürk's policy of "Peace at home, peace abroad" more effectively than it had been implemented in previous decades. The Motherland Party Administrations believed that in this era of vvhat they perceived as grovving interdependence at both regional and global levels, the resulting inevitable "economic co-operation [vvas] the best and most efficient method to achieve peace and stability" since it served to 30 On the one hand, the fundamental international changes brought about by the post-Cold War era -most visibly the collapse of communist regimes, beginning in Eastern Europe-reflected positively on the circumstances of the Turkish Müslim minority in Bulgaria and caused the emergence of seven nevv Turkish (Turkic) Republic in an area once called the Soviet Union, thus boosting Turkey's morale and its overall international posture. On the other hand, hovvever, they also created dangerous challenges to regional and vvorld order as the communist glacier receded from the Balkans, East Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia, leaving these areas in actual or potential turmoil created by various ethnic tensions. Surrounded by these increasingly unstable areas Turkey suddenly found itself threatened to an unprecedented degree since 34 War era in world politics was characterized by two opposing trends of integration and disintegration and that Turkey was "one of the active constructors of the new world order," a role that "history conferred upon her" by virtue of her geographical location, regional and international responsibilities and the variety of her cultural and historical ties. 37 On the same occasion, he also stated that in such a capacity Turkey was "ready and willing" to contribute to the formation of new regional integration schemes on the belief, reminiscent of that of his predecessors, that such integration schemes would contribute to the solution of regional crises through promoting peaceful dialogue.
From this global perspective, the OIC, as an international forum of 46 Islamic states constituting about one-third of the UN, could, in the eyes of Turkey's new administrators, serve Turkey's national objectives as an important part of global economic and political co-operation schemes. In the economic realm, the ncw coalition government seemed by no means willing to abandon the objective of securing Turkey's membership in the EC, despite increasingly discouraging prospects stemming from the uncertainties of postCold War Europe. 38 However, if regionalism were to supplant and undermine globalism, with Europe, North America and East Asia emerging as externally-closed trading blocks locking out the developing countries of Africa, Asia and the Middle East, including Turkey, the OIC, with its efforts towards securing free trade among Islamic states, could prove to be one of the alternative means of helping Turkey's economic development, in one capacity or another. In the political, and more specifically security realm, as the UN became in the eyes of Primer Demirel the "[Security] umbrella of the new 37 Cumhuriyet, July 1, 1992 p. 19. 38 See Hürriyet, May 6, 1992, p. 6. In contrast to his previous views, Turkish President Özal acknowledged that the collapse of the Iron Curtain, creating new rivals to Turkey, made this country's future membership in the EC "either very difficult or impossible". Ibid., December 10, 1991, p. 14.
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world", the OIC could complement both by activating or encouraging it to deal vvith the regional crises upsetting vvorld peace and by contributing to its enforcement mechanisms. 39 As vve vvill analyze next, the nevv coalition government appeared to be determined to perpetuate Turkey's contribution to the OIC's playing these functions in the economic and political realms in the post-Cold War era by perpetuating its predecessor's active bridge policy tovvard the OIC, a policy vvhich consisted of playing moderating, moderate and energizing roles in that organization.
IV. implementation of Turkey's "Active Bridge" Policy:
1984-1992:
Turkey's moderating and moderate roles as a member of the OIC emerged as by-products of its steadfast implementation of the multilateral policy that vvas characterized by its continuously balancing its commitments as an ally of the West and a friend of the Islamic states, regardless of their foreign policy orientations and roles.
In its capacity as a moderator, Turkey has tried to promote moderation on various Middle Eastern issues involving the US -like the Arab-Israeli conflict and the US-Iran conflict of 1985-by carrying messages betvveen the parties and encouraging them to adopt moderate positions. 40 In Turkey's criticism of the American action only as a "method" in combatting international terrorism was moderate in nature as opposed to the resolution passed on this issue by the OIC Summit of January 1987 "denouncing" the "intent" of the US resolution in question as "economic oppression for political reasons". 42 Concerning
the nevv coalition government made the relevant decision to that effect, seems to be due basically to the continuing Turkish concern not to damage ties vvith the West, particularly the Jevvish lobby in the US Congress that could be influential there in increasing American aid to Turkey. [VOL. XXı neutrality could be taken, when the choice was between joining the UN economic embargo and cooperating with the West in the process, or not joining it, vvhich meant supporting Iraqi aggression against Kuvvait that had been condemned vvorldvvide. 45 Also, there has been no indication on the part of the nevv coalition government, the Turkish Foreign Ministry or the Turkish Armed Forces that Turkey's future cooperation vvith the US in the Persian Gulf vvill develop at the expense of Turkey's traditional good and cautious relations vvith the regional states. Ali these sources of Turkish foreign policy appear deeply vvorried about the future consequences of the continuing anti-Saddam Hussein policies of the West to bring about the dismemberment of Iraq, seriously upsetting regional stability including Turkey's ovvn. Playing this role, Turkey took the follovving initiatives and made the follovving contributions to the efforts of the Islamic vvorld to ensure security in the Persian Gulf during the Iran-Iraq vvar and the Gulf crisis of August 1990 and its aftermath. In the course of his increasing contacts vvith the vvarring parties and various Persian Gulf states in 1987, Prime Minister Özal urged the Persian Gulf states to establish a "consultation mechanism" among themselves to prevent the outbreak of future hostilities. He simultaneously expressed Turkey's readiness to assume a proper role in the the "coordination" of this mechanism. 47 Later on, during the Seventeenth Islamic Conference decided to establish a group of "five eminent personalities" including a Turkish Ambassador to study the question of confidence and security-building measures in the region. 48 After the entry into force of a cease-fire betvveen Iran and Iraq in August 1988, Turkey agreed to participate in a UN multinational military observer force, consisting of contingents from five member countries of the OIC set up to oversee this ceasefire. West and the Islamic countries within the framevvork of the UN decision to ensure the withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait and restore the pre-crisis status quo in the region. Accordingly, she not only imposed an economic embargo on Iraq, cutting off the Turkish-Iraqi oil pipeline -vital for Iraqi oil exports-but also allowed the US to use air bases in Turkey as a stage for bombing operations inside Iraq and massed troops on Iraqi border -thus tying down a part of the Iraqi army to the North. These actions facilitated the speedy final victory of the allies against Iraq. 50 In the aftermath of the Gulf crisis of August 1990, faced with the problem of the thirty-thousand Kurdish refugees fleeing from the Iraqi massacre of Kurds in Northern Iraq, President Özal played a decisive role in "persuading" the initially reluctant President Bush, through telephone diplomacy, to establish "security zones" in Northern Iraq under the supervision of a UN peace keeping force, so as to protect the Kurds from the wrath of the Iraqi army. 51 In order to continue providing a "security umbrella" for the Kurds in Northern Iraq follovving the withdrawal of the US and allied military forces from Iraq, the Turkish Government made a decision in July 1991 to permit the establishment of a 2-3000 man "multinational force" -with Turkish participation-at the incirlik and Silopi bases on Turkish soil.
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The new Demirel government continued these bold policies of its predecessors with a new zeal. Through the invitation extended by Turkish President Özal and Foreign Minister Hikmet Çetin to the members of the OIC in May 1992, Turkey assumed a leading role in the Islamic world in bringing about the meeting of the Fifth Extraordinary Session of the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers in Turkey in June 1992 to examine the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina -the newly independent Republic of former Yugoslavia-where Serbian forces were committing indiscriminate violence against the Müslim and Croat populations. 53 Later, in August 1992, acting as the "Chairman of the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers", Turkey appealed the UN for an extraordinary convention of the UN General Assembly to discuss measures to put an end to the "ethnic cleansing" operation allegedly undertaken by the Serbs against the Muslims of BosniaHerzegovina.
These initiatives of the coalition Government -which were not limited to the situation in Bosnia but also concerned the ethnic tensions betvveen the 50 [. newly-independent former Soviet republics of Armenia and Azerbaijansymbolized Turkey's continuing determination to promote Islamic solidarity in the service of regional stability and of the perceived Turkish national interest of protecting the rights of Turkish communities in places -in this case Azerbaijan-where communist regimes previously reigned. This policy was a continuation of the Turkish efforts that began in the mid-1980s to secure the concern of the OIC in protecting the rights of Turkish minorities living in Bulgaria and Greece, an issue to be dwelled upon briefly later.
In the sphere of economic cooperation, in carrying out its chairmanship of COMCEC, the Turkish leadership made efforts to contribute to the development by COMCEC of a realistic approach to the goal of economic cooperation among Islamic states, pragmatically giving the goal of enhancing intra-Islamic trade top priority among the projects indicated in the Plan For Action. 55 The Turkish leadership also made efforts to provide COMCEC with an institutional identity, i.e., meeting regularly vvith a statute and rules of procedure. 56 The nevv coalition government, parallel to its support of the membership of the nevvly-independent Turkish and Islamic countries of the Balkans and Central Asia in the OIC as vvell as in the Economic Cooperation Organization [ECO] -originally established by Turkey, Iran and Pakistan in July 1964 under the name of Regional Cooperation for Development [RCD]-, also sought the expansion of COMCEC, accepting the membership of these countries, and appealed to Islamic capital to make joint investments there. 57 The hope behind this policy apparently vvas that ali these attempts at regional integration vvould first be successful in themselves and then complement each other in the future, generating peaceful solutions to regional crises through dialogue. With the notable exception of the cooperation vvith the Islamic countries and the West during the Kuvvait crisis of August 1990, the real Turkish contribution to the maintenance of stability in the Persian Gulf region through its membership in the OIC remained very limited indeed. Turkey's participation in the group of "five eminent personalities" established by the Seventeenth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers meeting of March 1988 to take charge of drafting confidence and security-building measures in the Persian Gulf could be considered a case in point. This Turkish participation may be seen as an important diplomatic achievement in Turkey's search for prestige in the region. indeed, it appeared to confirm that Islamic countries considered Turkey an important regional state vvhose vievvs över the question of maintaining peace and order in the region carried a certain vveight in their eyes. Hovvever, vvhen it came dovvn to actually leading the Islamic countries to adopt certain principles designed to promote security in the region -as is the case vvith Turkey's role in COMCEC, to be analyzed next-Turkish participation carried no vveight beyond its symbolic value. It turned out that the report prepared by the group did not attract the same interest among the members of the OIC as it did in Turkey. There has been no serious discussion of the report among the OIC members.
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What vvere the reasons for Turkey's inability to lead the Islamic countries in promoting regional security? One reason vvas related to the deep political divisions of the Islamic countries of the region among themselves on this subject, a gulf that vvas further vvidened by the atmosphere of mutual mistrust. As previously mentioned in connection vvith the activities of the Islamic Peace Committee, rather than serving as an instrument to enhance Islamic solidarity in political co-operation-in accordance vith its charter-the OIC has been a mirror reflecting the political disunity among Islamic states, particularly after the beginning of the Iran-Iraq vvar in September 1980 onvvard. The subsequent invasion of Kuvvait by Iraq in August 1990 further contributed to this disunity. This situation had a very discouraging impact on Turkish leaders even in carrying out Turkey's traditional role of acting as a moderator. In the case of the Iran-Iraq vvar, for example, faced vvith the radicalism and intransigence of Khomeini, Turkish President Kenan Evren felt he had to turn dovvn the requests of Islamic states for him to go to Tehran at the head of the Islamic Peace Committee and contact Khomeini personally to persuade him to stop Iran's struggle vvith Iraq, for fear of not succeeding in the job -a fear shared by Turkish Foreign Ministry circles-and of causing the "Turkey's prestige" in the eyes of the Islamic states to "suffer" through this failure. [.
Another reason for Turkey's inability stemmed from the difference betvveen the non-aligned international orientation of other regional Islamic countries and that of Turkey as an ally of the West. This difference manifested itself perhaps most notably in conjunction vvith Iran's vievv of establishing an Islamic Defense Pact that vvould keep the US outside the security considerations in the region. 61 Turkey did not rule out cooperation vvith the US -even though this vvould be balanced vvith the requirements of maintaining friendly relations vvith the regional states-to ensure stability in the region. This difference also manifested itself notably vvhen the previously-mentioned report, prepared by the joint group including Turkey, proposed the establishment of an Islamic World Court that vvould pass judgements concerning regional crises using Islamic principles. This vvas a scheme that vvas ideologically unacceptable to secular Turkey.
Yet another reason stemmed from the existence of certain disputes betvveen Turkey and its Arab Islamic neighbours like the issues of the Turkish military operations against Kurdish terrorist bases in Northern Iraq taking place since 1983 and the utilization of the vvaters of the Tigris and the Euphrates, a matter involving Turkey, Syria and Iraq. To the present, the Arab vvorld has continued to display solidarity against Turkey concerning these issues on various occasions. 62 It appears that behind the instances of this solidarity lay the historical Arab mistrust of the Turks suspected of having inherited the domineering instinct of their Ottoman ancestors. 63 In vievv of such factors it seems no surprise that there appeared no sign on the part of the regional Islamic states even to invite Turkey to participate in the regional security schemes conceived of to be set up after the Kuvvait crisis of 1990, let alone to seek her leadership in that respect.
As far as vvinning international support for international causes is concerned, Turkey's international orientation as an ally of the West continued to limit the support provided by the OIC resolutions on Cyprus issue, just as it served as one of the factors hindering co-operation betvveen Turkey and the regional states to promote regional stability, even though to a lesser extent. 65 Besides, they also withheld their economic and financial support from the Turkish Cypriot State.
Hovvever, limited as it was, the support provided by the OIC on the Cyprus issue was stili pleasing to Turkey. Despite the reluctance to grant full membership to Turkish Cypriot state, the "Turkish community of Cyprus" was granted representation in ali organs of the OIC and the right to participate in ali activities of the OIC at the İstanbul meeting of August 1991. The Turks considered this step as a political victory, characterizing it as "unnamed full membership". 66 Also, the same Conference decided, for the first time, "to cali on and urge the member states to increase and expand their relations with the Turkish Müslim Community of Cyprus in ali fields and in particular in the fields of trade, tourism, information, investment and sports". 67 The Conference also decided, again for the first time, to "request the Islamic Development Bank to undertake in consultation with the Turkish Müslim Community of Cyprus a comprehensive study on their economic development". 68 The "reaffirmation" of these resolutions and declaration of the İstanbul meeting on Cyprus by the Sixth Islamic Summit held in Dakar (Senegal) in December 1991, at the highest level, despite the intensive efforts of the pro-Cyprus lobby headed by the Algerian, Egyptian and Palestinian delegations, 69 crovvned the diplomatic victory achieved by the Turks in the previous İstanbul meeting of August 1991.
The emergence in the 1980s of other national causes similar to Cyprus, i.e., the issues of the oppression of the Turkish minorities in Bulgaria and Western Thrace in Greece, and the international support Turkey has been able to gather on them from the OIC -again despite its Western orientation-served to reaffirm the importance of Turkey's OIC membership in Turkish eyes. The OIC's solidarity with the Turkish minorities living in these places, a solidarity that was firmly mentioned in the OIC resolutions though not decisive in bringing about the cessation of the violation of their rights by the governments concerned, proved a welcome international moral support for the Turks of a kind that had been conspicuously lacking in the 1950s.
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Despite its limiting effect on the development of full political cooperation between Turkey and other Islamic members of the OIC, Turkey's alliance ties with the West served the Turkish objective of raising prestige -in the previously mentioned meaning of the term-in the eyes of both Islamic countries and the West. These countries have seen Turkey, a member of both NATO and the OIC, as a window, a channel of communications opening in both directions, as well as a bulwark against attempts -originating inside or outside the region-to overthrovv the status quo in the Middle East. From the perspective of the US and its Western European allies, impressed by the Turkish performance during the Kuvvait crisis of 1990, Turkey's dedication to democracy and a free market economy could serve to increase Western influence in the Islamic vvorld through Turkey's bilateral and multilateral connections vvith the regional Islamic states vvithin the framevvork of the OIC. Again from their perspective, Turkey could fulfill the same functionagain as a member of the OIC-in the region extending from the Balkans to the Caucasus and from the Middle East to Asia in the post-Cold War period if it vvas prepared to continue and expand its current active policy in a grand strategy covering these areas. The Turkish and Western press is full of reports and high-level Western statements to that effect. 71 From the perspective of the Islamic states, regardless of the degree of displeasure vvith they viewed Turkey's regional policy and its Western connections, Iran, the PLO, Syria and even Iraq after the Gulf War of 1991, have felt free, repeatedly up to the present, to request help from Turkey to make connections with the West and each other on their behalf as a diplomatic bridge, on matters concerning them.
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From the standpoint of Turkey's foreign policy objectives what was important in these events vvas not so much vvhether they provided Turkey vvith the opportunity to make substantial contributions to regional stability by influencing the other countries, vvhich is difficult to measure precisely anyvvay, or vvhether Turkey had the capacity to make such contributions and vvas vvilling to use it, to vvhich questions our previous analysis does not give fully affirmative ansvvers, but the fact that they shovved that Turkey held a certain degree of esteem in the eyes particularly of Islamic states regardless of the orientations of their foreign policy. It appears that this esteem stems from a degree of intimacy betvveen Turkey and the Islamic states -vvhatever the reasons that motivated it-that vvould have been unthinkable in the confrontational atmosphere of the 1950s. The mere existence of this intimacy could be regarded as the confirmation of the original Turkish expectations behind Turkey's nevv foreign policy vvhich, as previously mentioned, has never been so naive as to expect to control the minds and actions of other countries. In the opinion of this author, in vievv of the ever-present, deeprooted, intricate problems and national-ethnic animosities of Middle Eastern politics, Turkey, as a member and ally of the Western community, could hardly aim to achieve more, today and in the future.
VII. The Extraordinary OIC Meeting of Foreign Ministers of June 1992 on Bosnia-Herzegovina:
Being different from ali these international causes of Turkey, Turkey's energizing role vvithin the OIC concerning the issue of Bosnia-Herzegovina had special implications for the global aspects of Turkey's active bridge special policy pursued in the post-Cold War era. Even though the issues of Cyprus and the plight of the Turkish minorities in Bulgaria and Greece ali had more or less implications for the so-called "nevv international order" of the post-Cold War era, the ethnic conflict among the Serbs, Muslims and Croats of the nevvly independent state of Bosnia-Herzegovina has been treated in international platforms as one of the most important test cases for the post-Cold War vvorld order, together vvith the Gulf crisis of August 1990. [.
For one thing, the way in which the great majority of the members of the OIC-39 out of 46-heeded the invitation of Turkey to attend -at short notice-the Extraordinary Session of the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers in İstanbul in June 1992, vvith the Turkish Foreign Minister aeting as the "chairman", came as confirmation of Turkey's prestige among the members of the OIC. According to a Turkish nevvs commentator, this came as a sign that that country vvas emerging as "a rival" vis-a-vis Saudi Arabia and Iran for a "leadership" position in the OIC. 73 Aside from the very doubtful questions of vvhether any Islamic country, Arab or non-Arab, could have the overall capacity to lead the OIC in terms of promoting overall economic and political cooperation among its members -and not only in terms of leading the OIC to take certain positions on certain issues of vvorld affairs, like the issue of Bosnia-Herzegovina-and vvhether Turkey is capable of and vvilling to undertake such a role, a subject on vvhich our discussion vvill continue, it could be said that Turkey's global objectives in the postCold War era vvere reasonably vvell -served by its position in the OIC and the position taken by the OIC on the issue of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
It is true that the İstanbul meeting established no "Islamic Peace Force" to enforce peace in the region, vvhere Turkey considered diplomacy to shovv no signs of vvorking. Hovvever, in "urging" the UN Security Council to use military force against the Serbs if non-military measures did not suffice to stop their "ethnic eleansing" operation against Muslims and in calling upon the OIC member states "to provide full support to the United Nations" in these endeavors as vvell as calling for the establishment of a Contact Group to "follovv" and "revievv" developments surrounding the issue, the meeting endorsed Turkey's vievvs vvithout amendment. 74 Furthermore, Turkey's appeal, as the "Chairman of the Islamic Conference of Foreign Minsters", for the UN General Assembly to hold an extraordinary meeting on Bosnia-Herzegovina vvas successful and the subsequent meeting of the General Assembly produced a decision,vvhich, to the pleasure of the Turks, also recommended military intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 75 These developments and the invitation vvhich Turkey received from the West to attend the London Conference to be met later in August 1992 do discuss the issue of Bosnia-Herzegovina, in its capacity as " regarded as another indication of Turkey's prestige in the eyes of the West due to its OIC connection, which in this case apparently combined with and strengthened its overall geopolitical value.
Going back to the declarations of the Extraordinary OIC meeting in İstanbul, particularly important from the point of view of the foreign policy objectives of Turkey was the way the OIC, not merely lent support to the UN to tackle an important security problem, but also pushed it to fulfill its historic mission of making militarily contributions to overall security in the post-Cold War world -a mission the UN seemed unwilling at the time to carry out-supplementing thus the efforts of Turkey to the same effect. Whether or not the great powers of the West that made up the bulk of the UN Security Council and that met in London in August 1992 were ready to activate the UN to enable it to fulfil this historic mission was of course another question, made ali the more doubtful by the subsequent inaction of both. Yet, it seems important to note that because of its own limited capabilities (not only matcrially, but also because of the persisting image of post-Ottoman imperialism outside Turkey) 77 Turkey could not hope to do anything more than to activate international public opinion -as was the case with the Bulgarian and Greek issues-to put pressure on the UN Security Council to handle the problem. Actually, it is this limited capability of Turkey in fulfilling its self-imposed mission as one of the leading countries constructing the "new world order" that makes the often reported Western and domestic vievvs of Turkey as a regional super-power that might be dedicated to the revival of the Ottoman imperial legacy 78 rather unrealistic.
The extraordinary İstanbul meeting of the OIC also served Turkey's objectives in the post-Cold War era reasonably well by admitting the Republic of Türkmenistan to full membership of the OIC and by expressing its "solidarity" with the Republic of Azerbaijan and appealing to Armenia "...to review and renounce its agrressive policy of expansionism" as perceivedly revealed by the occupation by Armenian forces of NagornoKarabakh, the Lachin district and the border regions of Nakhichevan; ali internationlly-recognized Azerbaijani territories. 79 It vvas obviously true that in addition to the mere passage of resolutions defıning the issues of the Islamic vvorld, the readiness of the OIC members, as Turkey actually vvas, to take coordinated joint action that vvould not exclude military measures integrated vvith international collective security-the UN-for the solution of regional problems like BosniaHerzegovina vvould be desirable from the perspective of Turkey's global objectives. Yet, at the time the Extraordinary OIC conference convened in İstanbul, this Organization stili did not seem to have got very far dovvn the road to the vvide-ranging cooperation and coordination in ali fields among its menbers insistently called for in its Charter. In fact, let alone dravving up for themselves clear-cut objectives and an effective strategy -even on the most sensitive issue to ali, the Arab-Israeli conflict-as an initial stage in attempting such cooperation and coordination, they did not appear ready even to come together to discuss their problems yet. This appearance vvas conveyed by the division created among the Arabs, during the Dakar summit of December 1991 över vvhether or not to mention jihad against Israel in the Final Communique, vvhile eleven Arab leaders failed to shovv up for the same meeting at ali, reportedly in protest at the PLO backing of Iraq during the Kuvvait crisis of 1990.
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VIII. Economic
Cooperation Betvveen Turkey and the OIC the COMCEC Experience:
By giving Turkey the Chairmanship of COMCEC, the members of the OIC shovved a notable vvillingness to be led by that country in promoting economic cooperation among themselves, a vvillingness that vvas conspicuously lacking, as vve have seen, concerning political and security issues. Hovvever, Turkey's actual effetiveness in this area also remained limited by certain important factors and structural problems that impeded the satisfactory implementation of the Plan For Action vvithin the framevvork of the OIC. 81 Among these factors vvere "catastrophic" financial limitations, 80 See FBIS, near East and South Asia, December 11, 1991, pp. 24-25. See also Ibid., December 12, 1991, p. 13. 81 The level of intra-Islamic trade, accounting far about 10 percent of Islamic countries' foreign trade in 1991, stili falls far short of the avvovvedly desired level. For this and ali the problems impeding the implementation of the Plan for Action, see Annex 4 to OIC/COMCEC/7-91/REP in Report, lack of data and information and the slow response of the member states. The structural problems were the fact that the Islamic countries did not constitute a regional unit and pursued different policies, the non-complementary nature of their economies and the inadequacy of their infrastructures; ali these have proved very difficult to overcome so as to achieve the realization of the ultimate objective of economic cooperation among Islamic countries: the Islamic Common Market
What specific benefits has Turkey so far been able to draw from the COMCEC experience? Whatever the chances of achieving the targets for economic cooperation among the Islamic countries vvithin the framework of COMCEC vvere, it appears that the hosting of that committee greatly helped Turkey in its efforts to develop its relations with the Islamic countries at the bilateral level. In this respect, the various ministerial level meetings that have been held so far under the umbrella of COMCEC and the COMCEC follow-up meetings have ali served as international forums where Turkish views with them and seek their support on political matters as well as economic issues of special importance to Turkey. For example, the Secretary General of the OIC, Dr. Hamid al-Gabid's appeal to the member states, during the Fifth meeting of COMCEC in İstanbul in September 1989, to extend moral and material support to the Turks expelled from Bulgaria -eiven though non-discussion of political matters is a principle in COMCEC meetings-vvas an important international moral boost for Turkey at a time vvhen it badly needed it. COMCEC meetings particularly the various ministerial -level meetings, have also served as a meeting ground for Turkish businessmen vvho have been able to contact the statesmen of Islamic states there to obtain first-hand information leading to business connections in Islamic countries. It appears, hovvever, that many Turkish businessmen have proved less than enthusiastic about attending COMCEC meetings to explore business opportunities in Islamic countries, the reason for this being that they could make much more handsome profits at home vvith much fevver -or no-bureaucratic difficulties.
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Turkey's connection vvith COMCEC has also facilitated the implementation of the nevv Turkish foreign policy in establishing nevv ties vvithin the Islamic vvorld vvhile strengthening the aİready established ones. It helped Turkey to institutionalize its ongoing efforts to expand its bilateral ties vvith the Islamic states from the region of the Middle East, vvhere those ties had originally begun to be established in the 1970s, to Africa, Asia, and -vvith the collapse of the Soviet Union-Central Asia and the Caucasus. Worth mentioning in this context is Turkey's pledge of 10 million dollars in assistance to the drought-stricken countries of the African Sahel during the [. First Session of COMCEC held in 1984. Altogether, it was a further step by the Turks to perpetuate their previous isolated efforts to expand bilateral ties vvith the Islamic states, starting under the military regime of the early 1980, this time in an international setting. Even though the amount of the pledge vvas quite symbolic, it could serve as a means of impressing the Islamic vvorld vvith Turkey's determination to contribute to Islamic solidarity in the field of economy and commerce even vvhile struggling to realize its ovvn economic development, thereby inspiring sympathy vvith Turkey. 83 Lastly, and, it seems, most importantly, to Turkey, COMCEC chairmanship provides the Turks vvith the prestigious position that they have alvvays sought in their relations vvith the Islamic vvorld, a position that is expected to produce respect in the eyes of Turkey's Western allies. The Turks seem to derive particular satisfaction from that position. They claim that it is the Turkish leadership that has been the driving factor behind COMCEC's achievements so far. According to them, Turkish leadership contributed to the development by COMCEC of a realistic approach to the aim of economic cooperation among the Islamic states, pragmatically giving the aim of increasing intra-Islamic trade top priority among the projects indicated in the Plan For Action. 84 They also attribute the present established institutional identity of COMCEC -i.e., its regular meetings vvith a statute and rules of procedure adopted at the seventh session of COMCEC in October 1991-to an atmosphere of organizational discipline achieved under the uniting leadership of Turkey. 85 The election of the Turkish President to the permanent chairmanship -and the Turkish Prime Minister to the Altemate chairmanshipof the General Assembly Bureau of COMCEC at the Seventh Session of COMCEC held in 1991, indicates a further strengthening of Turkey's prestigious position in COMCEC.
As for the development of Turkey's relations vvith the Islamic vvorld in specific fields after Turkey took on the chairmanship of COMCEC, the record vvas one of ups and downs. Despite the optimistic -and somevvhat desperate-vievv of the Motherland Party leaders previously menlioned to the effect that the necessity of economic cooperation due to increasing interdependence eases political tensions in a controlling manner, quite the reverse occurred. The success of the economic cooperation betvveen Turkey and the OIC depended ultimately on the actual development of Turkey's bilateral economic relations vvith the Islamic countries and on the development of multilateral economic co-operation among the members of the OIC themselves, both of these being conditioned by politics to a considerable extent. As far as the former matter vvas concerned, as if to 83 See Milliyet, January 8, 1988, p. 5. 84 See note 36. 85 Ibid.
deliberately refute the aforementioned arguments emerging in the West in the early 1980s to the effect that the Turkish economy was shifting towards the Islamic countries, the share of Turkey's exports to the Islamic countries in its total exports declined steadily from 45.79% in 1983 to 28.97% in 1988, 25% in 1989 and 19% in 1990 . 86 In addition to the drastic decline in crude oil prices in early 1986, which reduced the purehasing power of both Iraq and Iran -two of Turkey's biggest trade partners-the Iran-Iraq war (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) and the subsequent Kuwait crisis of August 1990 played a majör role here. Likewise, these and other political conflicts, whether between Turkey and Islamic states like the question of the utilization of the waters of the Euphrates river or among regional states like the Arab-Israeli conflict caused considerable Turkish losses in the fields of contracting activities and energy.
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As far as multilateral cooperation was concerned, that depended on the implementation of the economic cooperation projects adopted by COMCEC. This, in turn, was ultimately related to the political will of the member states -as the Turks themselves acknovvledge-as well as to the non-political factors impeding the implementation of the Plan For Action previously referred to. Whether or not OIC member states would demonstrate this political will remained to be seen, particularly in view of the apparent grovvth of a tendeney on the part of the OIC members to form regional blocs among themselves, such as the Arab Cooperation Council and the Arab Maghreb Union, both established in 1989.
IX. Prospects for the Future:
As Turkey's political and economic interests become more complex and the country's aims look more achievable and at the same time more difficult to achieve through the efforts of Turkey alone given the advance of the post-Cold War era uncertainties concerning global order, the importance of the OIC as a foreign policy instrument of Turkey may be expected to inerease. In this context, since Turkey's balanced policy betvveen the Müslim East and the West has become more relevant than ever in this new era, this country may be expected to continue to play its traditional moderate, moderating and energizing role in the OIC, contributing to the efforts of the organization in the direetion of political and economic cooperation. [.
The emergence of the Turkic states, whcih appear to have already adopted the Turkish model in their attempts at Westernization, as nevv potential members of the OIC offer good prospects for increased Turkish effectiveness in the OIC. Hovvever, as in the past, structural and political differences enhanced by historical factors among the members of the OIC, including Turkey, vvhich shovv no signs of fading avvay easily in the foreseeable future may be expected to persist, limiting both the effectiveness of Turkey's leadership and its enthusiasm in energizing political and economic co-operation among the members of the OIC for common economic development and regional stability. A case in point could be the future relationhip betvveen the OIC and the UN on the one hand, and the OIC and regional organizations like the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Arab Cooperation Council, the Arab Magreb Union and the Black Sea Region of Economic Cooperation on the other, in promoting global and regional economic and political cooperation vvith Turkey playing a certain role in the process. It is not inconceivable, for example, in the opinion of this author, that Turkey may be vvilling to cooperate vvith at least certain Islamic states in an Islamic collective security scheme not necessarily something similar to the Conference on Security and Cooperation of European (CSCE) vvhich the Turks are convinced to be difficult -if not impossible-to establish if only because Islamic countries being located in different continents 88 integrated vvith the UN vvith a vievv to handling certain regional security issues (not only in the Persian Gulf) using ali means, including military.
For one thing, hovvever, as its passive attitude during the current issue of Bosnia-Herzegovina reveals, the UN appears to be no more ready in the post-Cold War period than it vvas previously to confront "any aggressor ayvvhere", and thus to implement the main principle of collective security action. This, if true, casts a dark shadovv on its previously-mentioned image in Turks' eyes as the "[security] umbrella of the nevv vvorld." As for the OIC members, due to the absence of the political vvill vvithin that organization, they do not demonstrate a vvillingness to go beyond the OIC's recent role on the issue of Bosnia-Herzegovina of urging the UN to take the necessary military measures, being ready to join forces vvith the UN, as Turkey, is should the UN ultimately decide to take those measures. Besides, due to the policy of benevolent neutrality tovvard regional Islamic states, vvhech it is apparently continuing to pursue, Turkey can not be expected to contribute to the same degree even to Persian Gulf security in the future as it did during the Gulf crisis of August 1990, if Islamic states do not act almost unanimously, cooperating vvith the UN as they did against Saddam's Iraq during that crisis. 
1993] TURKEY AND THE OıC: 1984-1992 131
As regards the relationship betvveen the OIC and regional organizations in promoting regional economic cooperation and political stability, one question is vvhether these regional establishments vvill hamper or complement the activities of the OIC to secure Islamic solidarity among its members in the field of economic cooperation in the future. Another question appears to be vvhether regional establishments as examples of regional integration processes -being parts of or complementary to the broader scheme of the OIC-contribute to the solution of regional crises through promoting peaceful dialogue. Despite the optimistic functionalist Turkish vievv that the necessity of economic cooperation among the Islamic states is bound to smooth out their political circumstances. The former question is ultimately a question of the political vvill of the members, vvhich is difficult to foresee, vvhile the ansvver to the latter vvill depend on vvhether there exists the necessary political consensus on the parts of the members of the regional establishments that vvould be necessary for economic cooperation to begin; a condition that hardly exists, for example, in today's Black Sea Region of Economic Cooperation.
